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Since at least World War II, the Supreme Court has struggled with the 
question of whether aliens outside the United States could claim the protections of 
the Constitution.1 Since that time, the Court has only addressed the question in two 
instances: First, in its 1990 decision in United States v. Verdugo-Urquidez,2 where it 
held that the Warrant Clause of the Fourth Amendment3 does not apply to the 
search of an alien’s home in Mexico. Second, in 2008’s Boumediene v. Bush, where 
the Court held that the Suspension Clause of the Constitution4 did apply to alleged 
enemy combatants held in a Navy facility in Guantanamo Bay, Cuba.5 
These two contrasting outcomes have been treated very differently by the 
lower courts. While lower courts have spent nearly thirty years expanding the reach 
of the Court’s holding in Verdugo-Urquidez to circumstances and amendments 
beyond the core holding,6 they have taken an opposite approach in the decade since 
Boumediene, cabining that case to its specific facts.7 The question reached the Court 
again in the form of lawsuits over cross-border shootings by U.S. border patrol 
agents of Mexican citizens.8 Given the growing importance of the question, the 
conflicting precedent, and the complete lack of guidance provided by the Court’s 
1990 decision, the time is ripe for a reconsideration of the reasoning of Verdugo-
Urquidez. 
 
*  Adjunct Professor, Virginia Commonwealth University. Assistant Counsel, Naval Facilities Engineering 
Command, Northwest. The views expressed in this article are solely those of the author and do not reflect 
the views of the Department of the Navy. I would like to thank Professor Orin Kerr and James Fallows 
Tierney for their comments on earlier drafts of this article, as well as Professor Emeritus Ira “Chip” Lupu, 
formerly of the George Washington University School of Law, for pointers on incorporating rights via the 
Due Process Clause. Any mistakes are mine alone. 
1  Johnson v. Eisentrager, 339 U.S. 763 (1950) (holding that U.S. courts have no jurisdiction over prisoners of 
war detained in Germany). 
2  United States v. Verdugo-Urquidez, 494 U.S. 259 (1990). 
3  U.S. CONST. amend. IV (“[N]o Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or 
affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized.”). 
4  U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 2 (“The Privilege of the Writ of Habeas Corpus shall not be suspended, unless 
when in Cases of Rebellion or Invasion the public Safety may require it.”). 
5  Boumediene v. Bush, 553 U.S. 723 (2008). 
6  See cases cited infra notes 62–107. 
7  See, e.g., Al Maqaleh v. Hagel, 738 F.3d 312, 336 n.16 (D.C. Cir. 2013), vacated on other grounds by 
Amanatullah v. Obama, 575 U.S. 908 (2015); Kiyemba v. Obama, 555 F.3d 1022, 1032 (D.C. Cir. 2009) 
vacated and remanded sub nom. Kiyemba v. Obama, 559 U.S. 131 (2010). 
8  See, e.g., Hernandez v. Mesa, 885 F.3d 811 (5th Cir. 2018), cert. granted 139 S. Ct. 2636 (2019); Rodriguez v. 
Swartz, 899 F.3d 719 (9th Cir. 2018). While the Court has so far focused on the question of whether a 
remedy is available, it is only a matter of time before the antecedent question of whether aliens have rights 
to press in U.S. courts finds its way back. Justice Ginsburg specifically mentioned Verdugo-Urquidez in her 
dissent. Hernandez v. Mesa, 140 S. Ct. 735, 754 n.1 (2020) (Ginsburg, J., dissenting). 
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Verdugo-Urquidez fails on a number of levels. Almost immediately, the 
opinion received criticism from those in academia,9 which has largely been borne 
out over the subsequent decades.10 It sets up an open-ended and largely undefined 
test, which provides no guidance to lower courts.11 As a result, lower courts have 
struggled to apply Verdugo-Urquidez’s reasoning to cases involving the Fourth 
Amendment, which it purported to address. Moreover, the cramped analysis fails to 
offer guidance about the application of other constitutional guarantees that do not 
share the language and structure of the Fourth Amendment. But this has not 
prevented lower courts from importing the Court’s analysis to clauses where it is 
wholly inapplicable.12 
The solution to these twin problems lies with two potential solutions. First, I 
offer an outline that courts applying Verdugo-Urquidez can follow to determine 
when an alien’s connections to the United States become substantial enough that 
the alien may claim the protection of the Fourth Amendment. I argue that courts 
should look at both the quality and quantity of connections, with a recognition that 
certain connections, by their nature, are more substantial than others. I also argue 
that the age of the connection matters. Older, maintained connections are more 
substantial than newer or fleeting ones. I also argue that courts should apply a 
presumption that stale connections are no longer valid. But easier than merely 
trying to place guideposts around the substantial connections test propounded by 
Verdugo-Urquidez is to craft a bright line rule that, anytime a search is conducted 
by agents of the United States, the protections of the Fourth Amendment should 
apply.  
I argue for two doctrinally sound ways to extend the protections of the Fourth 
Amendment to aliens abroad: 1) offering the same protection offered to US citizens 
when US agents conduct, or substantially participate in, searches abroad; and 2) 
extending it as a component of due process. I then offer a practical means of 
enforcing the Amendment, grounded in an earlier “joint venture” test utilized by 
lower courts both before and after Verdugo-Urquidez. Under this test, courts first 
examine whether United States agents played a substantial role in the 
extraterritorial search. If they did not, then the Fourth Amendment does not apply. 
If, however, those agents did substantially participate in an extraterritorial search, 
then the Fourth Amendment’s reasonableness requirement should travel with 
them. The only additional exception would be cases where the conduct of foreign 
 
9  See Douglas I. Koff, Post-Verdugo-Urquidez: The Sufficient Connection Test – Substantially Ambiguous, 
Substantially Unworkable, 25 COLUM. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 435 (1994); Janet E. Mitchell, The Selective 
Application of the Fourth Amendment: United States v. Verdugo-Urquidez, 41 CATH. U.L. REV. 289 (1991); 
Mary Lynn Nicholas, United States v. Verdugo-Urquidez: Restricting the Borders of the Fourth Amendment, 
14 FORDHAM INT’L L. REV. 267 (1990); Mindy Ann Oppenheim, United States v. Verdugo-Urquidez: Hands 
Across the Border – The Long Reach of United States Agents Abroad, and the Short Reach of the Fourth 
Amendment, 17 BROOK. J. INT’L L. 617 (1991); Leonard X. Rosenberg, Fourth Amendment – Search and 
Seizure of Property Abroad: Erosion of the Rights of Aliens: United States v. Verdugo-Urquidez, 110 S. Ct. 
1056 (1990), 81 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 779 (1991).  
10  See infra notes 62–83 and accompanying text. 
11  See infra Section III.A. 
12  See infra Section III.B. 
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agents is so egregious that it “shocks the judicial conscience.” In those cases, even if 
there were no participation by U.S. agents, U.S. courts should refuse to admit 
evidence of criminal activity. 
I. UNITED STATES V. VERDUGO-URQUIDEZ AND THE EXTRATERRITORIAL 
WARRANT REQUIREMENT 
Rene Martin Verdugo-Urquidez was a citizen and resident of Mexico.13 The 
U.S. Drug Enforcement Agency suspected him of being one of the leaders of a large 
and violent drug cartel in Mexico, responsible for smuggling marijuana into the 
United States, as well as participating in the kidnapping, torture, and murder of a 
DEA special agent.14 In January 1986, after discussions with U.S. Marshalls, 
Mexican police apprehended Verdugo-Urquidez and delivered him to the United 
States Border Patrol station in Calexico, California, where he was arrested and 
transferred to a correctional facility in San Diego to await trial.15 
Following Verdugo-Urquidez’s arrest, DEA agents decided to arrange for a 
search of his residences located in Mexicali and San Felipe, Mexico.16 U.S. agents, 
joined by officers of the Mexican Federal Judicial Police (MFJP), searched Verdugo-
Urquidez’s home and seized documents, including a tally sheet believed to show 
quantities of marijuana smuggled into the United States.17 
Verdugo-Urquidez moved to suppress the evidence seized in his Mexican 
residences, and the District Court granted the motion, concluding that the Fourth 
Amendment applied to the searches and the DEA agents failed to justify the search 
without a warrant.18 The Ninth Circuit, in a divided opinion, affirmed the 
decision.19 On appeal, the Court was asked to determine whether the Fourth 
Amendment applied to an extraterritorial search of a non-U.S. citizen. The Court 
held that it did not. 
After reciting this factual and procedural history, the majority opinion held 
that, unlike the Fifth Amendment, a violation of the Fourth Amendment is “fully 
accomplished” at the time of the unreasonable government intrusion.20 Under the 
majority’s approach, the violation occurs at the time of the search. Thus, any 
constitutional violation occurred solely in Mexico.21 
The Court then turned to the text of the Fourth Amendment: 
 
13  United States v. Verdugo-Urquidez, 494 U.S. 259, 262 (1990). 
14  Id. Verdugo-Urquidez was subsequently convicted of the murder in a separate prosecution. See United 
States v. Verdugo-Urquidez, 29 F.3d 637 (Table), 1994 WL 279226 (9th Cir. Aug. 5, 1994). 
15  494 U.S. at 262. 
16  Id. 
17  Id. at 262–63. 
18  Id. at 263. 
19  United States v. Verdugo-Urquidez, 856 F.2d 1214 (9th Cir. 1988). 
20  Verdugo-Urquidez, 494 U.S. at 264 (first citing United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338, 354 (1974); then 
citing United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 906 (1984)). 
21  494 U.S. at 264. 
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The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, 
and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be 
violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, 
supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the 
place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized.22 
The majority adopted the logic of Chief Judge Wallace’s dissent in the Ninth 
Circuit, finding that the term “the people” was a “term of art employed in select 
parts of the Constitution.”23 The Court noted that, in addition to the Fourth 
Amendment, the phrase appears in the Preamble, the Second Amendment, the 
Ninth and Tenth Amendments, and the First Amendment’s protections of the rights 
to assembly and petition, as well as in Article I, Section 2, clause 2.24 The Court 
acknowledged this was not conclusive, but believed it suggested that “the people” 
protected by these Amendments were “a class of persons who are part of a national 
community or who have otherwise developed sufficient connection with this country 
to be considered part of that community.”25 The Court concluded that “the purpose 
of the Fourth Amendment was to protect the people of the United States against 
arbitrary action by their own government; it was never suggested that the provision 
was intended to restrain the actions of the Federal Government against aliens 
outside of the United States territory.”26 
Looking to precedent, the Court invoked the Insular Cases, a series of 
decisions at the turn of the twentieth century collectively holding that 
constitutional provisions did not apply uniformly to territory over which the United 
States is sovereign,27 unless that territory is destined for eventual statehood.28 Only 
rights determined to be “fundamental” apply in these “unincorporated” territories.29 
 
22  U.S. CONST. amend. IV. 
23  494 U.S. at 265. 
24  Id. (“The House of Representatives shall be composed of Members chosen every second Year by the People of 
the several States.”). 
25  Id. (contrasting with the language in the Fifth and Sixth Amendments, which use the terms “person” and 
“accused,” respectively). 
26  Id. at 266. 
27  Id. at 268 (citing the Insular Cases: Balzac v. Porto Rico, 258 U.S. 298 (1922) (Sixth Amendment right to a 
jury trial inapplicable in Puerto Rico); Ocampo v. United States, 234 U.S. 91 (1914) (Fifth Amendment 
grand jury provision inapplicable in Philippines); Dorr v. United States, 195 U.S. 138 (1904) (jury trial 
provision inapplicable in Philippines); Hawaii v. Mankichi, 190 U.S. 197 (1903) (provisions on indictment by 
grand jury and jury trial inapplicable in Hawaii); and Downes v. Bidwell, 182 U.S. 244 (1901) (Uniform 
Duty Clause not applicable to Puerto Rico)). For more on the Insular Cases, as well as a critique, see 
generally Alan Tauber, The Empire Forgotten: The Application of the Bill of Rights to U.S. Territories, 57 
CASE W. RES. L. REV. 147, 154–73 (2006). 
28  Hawaii v. Mankichi stands out in that Hawaii later did become a state. However, in 1903, when Mankichi 
was decided, that was hardly self-evident in the same way that territory in the continental United States 
was viewed as destined for statehood. Additionally, the “territorial incorporation doctrine,” created by 
Justice White in several early concurrences in the Insular Cases did not achieve majority recognition until 
1922 in Balzac v. Porto Rico, 258 U.S. Today, the territories falling into this category are Puerto Rico, 
Guam, the U.S. Virgin Islands, the Commonwealth of the Northern Mariana Islands, and American Samoa. 
29  Verdugo-Urquidez, 494 U.S. at 268 (distinguishing, in the context of the Insular Cases, “fundamental” 
rights from “procedural” rights; while the language is similar to that used in debates over incorporation of 
rights to the States via the Fourteenth Amendment, the rights deemed to be “fundamental” are different); 
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According to the Court, if U.S. citizens in unincorporated U.S. territories are not 
entitled to all constitutional rights, the case for aliens in foreign nations is even 
weaker.30 
The majority then noted that the Court has rejected application of the far 
broader Fifth Amendment to aliens outside the sovereign territory of the United 
States in Johnson v. Eisentrager.31 While Eisentrager acknowledged that the alien 
“has been accorded a generous and ascending scale of rights as he increases his 
identity with our society[,]”32 the majority described the Court’s rejection of the 
extraterritorial application of the Fifth Amendment as “emphatic:”33 
Such extraterritorial application of organic law would have been so 
significant an innovation in the practice of governments that, if 
intended or apprehended, it could scarcely have failed to excite 
contemporary comment. Not one word can be cited. No decision of this 
Court supports such a view. None of the learned commentators on our 
Constitution has even hinted at it. The practice of every modern 
government is opposed to it.34 
Given this rejection of the Fifth Amendment, which uses the nearly universal term 
“person,” the Court believed a similar fate should befall the Fourth Amendment, 
which applies only to “the people.”35 
 In support of his claim that the seized evidence should be suppressed, 
Verdugo-Urquidez relied on a series of cases holding that aliens enjoy constitutional 
rights.36 The Court held that this series of cases “establish[ed] only that aliens 
receive constitutional protections when they have come within the territory of the 
United States and [have] developed substantial connections with this country.”37 
Verdugo-Urquidez had no prior significant connections with the United States, and 
his status at the time of the search—lawful but involuntary—also did not create a 
substantial connection.38 He had been in United States custody only a few days 
when the search was executed, and the majority did not think the applicability of 
 
see also Edward C. Carter, III, The Extra-Territorial Reach of the Privilege Against Self Incrimination or 
Does the Privilege “Follow the Flag?”, 25 S. Ill. U. L.J. 313, 320–21 (2001); Tauber, supra note 27, at 166–68. 
30  Verdugo-Urquidez, 494 U.S. at 268. 
31  Johnson v. Eisentrager, 339 U.S. 763, 785 (1950). 
32  Id. at 770. 
33  Verdugo-Urquidez, 494 U.S. at 269. 
34  Eisentrager, 339 U.S. at 784–85 (internal citations omitted). 
35  Verdugo-Urquidez, 494 U.S. at 269. 
36  See also  Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 211–12 (1982) (undocumented immigrants protected by Equal 
Protection Clause); Kwong Hai Chew v. Colding, 344 U.S. 590, 596 (1953) (resident alien is a “person” 
within the meaning of the Fifth Amendment); Bridges v. Wixon, 326 U.S. 135, 148 (1945) (resident aliens 
have certain First Amendment rights); Russian Volunteer Fleet v. United States, 282 U.S. 481, 489 (1931) 
(aliens entitled to protection of the Just Compensation Clause of the Fifth Amendment); Wong Wing v. 
United States, 163 U.S. 228, 238 (1896) (resident aliens entitled to Fifth and Sixth Amendment rights); 
Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356, 369 (1886) (resident aliens protected by the Fourteenth Amendment). 
37  Verdugo-Urquidez, 494 U.S. at 271. 
38  Id. 
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the Fourth Amendment should turn on the chance that the custodian of the 
nonresident alien owner had or had not transported him to the United States at the 
time of the search.39 
The Court ended its opinion with a brief discussion of the negative practical 
consequences of adopting Verdugo-Urquidez’s position. According to the Court, 
applying the Fourth Amendment overseas would risk interfering with national 
security and disrupting the ability of the political branches to respond to foreign 
crises.40 More alarming to the Court, if Verdugo-Urquidez’s position carried the day, 
aliens with no attachment to the United States might be entitled to damages 
actions against federal agents for violations of the Fourth Amendment in foreign 
countries or international waters.41 While acknowledging that there may be limits 
to such remedies, the Court still felt that applying the Fourth Amendment abroad 
would plunge legislative and executive branch employees into a “sea of uncertainty” 
as to what might be reasonable in conducting searches and seizures abroad.42 
Therefore, based on the text, history, precedent, and practical concerns, the Court 
concluded that if there are to be limits on searches and seizures abroad, they must 
be imposed by the political branches.43 
II. PROBLEMS WITH VERDUGO-URQUIDEZ’S REASONING 
Prevailing practice in the lower courts has demonstrated that, as predicted 
by scholars when the decision came out, the rule from Verdugo-Urquidez provides so 
little guidance about the “substantial connections” test that it creates the very 
problem it was trying to solve. One of the key practical concerns raised by the Court 
was that law enforcement officers would be plunged into a “sea of uncertainty.” But 
as history has shown, the Court’s test causes just as much uncertainty in searches 
occurring abroad, and brings that sea to our own shores, complicating the question 
for domestic searches as well. As this part will demonstrate, the Verdugo-Urquidez 
“substantial connections” test suffers from two major problems: 1) it provides no 
guidance to lower courts on important matters; and 2) as a result, its reasoning has 
been applied to constitutional provisions that are not analogous to the Fourth 
Amendment, sowing greater confusion in the law. 
In his dissent, Justice Brennan predicted some of the problems encountered 
by the lower courts,44 as explored in this section. Surprisingly, the majority failed to 
directly engage with his criticisms. Justice Brennan took issue with the test laid out 
 
39  Id. at 272. 
40  See id. at 273–74. 
41  Id. at 274 (first citing Bivens v. Six Unknown Fed. Narcotics Agents, 403 U.S. 388 (1971); then citing 
Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386 (1989); then citing Tennessee v. Garner, 471 U.S. 1 (1985)). 
42  Id. 
43  Id. at 275. 
44  Verdugo-Urquidez, 494 U.S. at 279–97 (Brennan, J., dissenting). These criticisms fall into four broad 
categories: 1) that the Fourth Amendment is the “unavoidable correlative” of the Constitution’s powers to 
criminalize behavior;  2) criticisms of the test laid out by the majority; 3) issues with the majority’s 
treatment of the cases it relied upon; and 4) disagreement with the practical concerns laid out by the 
majority and Justice Kennedy’s concurrence. Id. 
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by the majority. He noted that, even within the majority opinion, the contours of the 
test shift and lack definition, sometimes appearing to require physical presence, 
while at others a voluntary connection.45 He also observed that the Court failed to 
address what the Fourth Amendment requires should an alien actually have 
substantial voluntary connections.46 Finally, he took the majority to task for failing 
to note that Verdugo-Urquidez had one of the strongest possible connections—he 
was being held in the physical custody of the United States.47 
There are other flaws with the majority’s reasoning that Justice Brennan 
does not address. For example, the Court purports to interpret the term “the 
people,” but this term applies to unreasonable searches, not the warrant 
requirement. Thus, relying on the term of art “the people” to limit the reach of the 
Warrant Clause is logically inconsistent with the wording of the Fourth 
Amendment. Furthermore, some of the practical issues raised by the Court are 
based entirely on concerns about applying the warrant requirement and its 
demands for probable cause.48 Because the term “the people” does not modify the 
Warrant Clause, those practical concerns are focused solely on the application of a 
warrant outside U.S. territory and do not support the Court’s finding that “the 
people” are limited to U.S. citizens and those with substantial ties to the United 
States.49 
A. The “Substantial Connections” Test Provides No Guidance to Lower Courts 
Justice Brennan, in his dissent, identifies the lack of guidance and shifting 
requirements the majority opinion identifies.50 The majority never provides any 
direction as to the type or number of connections an alien must have to be 
considered one of “the people” entitled to the protection of the Fourth Amendment.51 
The majority requires an undefined “sufficient connection” which, at times, is 
described as physical presence within the United States and the establishment of 
“substantial connections.”52 Elsewhere, the Court suggests that an alien’s presence 
 
45  Id. at 282–83. 
46  Id. at 283 n.7. 
47  Id. at 283–84. 
48  Id. at 274 (majority opinion) (“Indeed, the Court of Appeals held that absent exigent circumstances, United 
States agents could not effect a ‘search or seizure’ for law enforcement purposes in a foreign country 
without first obtaining a warrant, which would be a dead letter outside the United States, from a 
magistrate in this country. Even if no warrant were required, American agents would have to articulate 
specific facts giving them probable cause to undertake a search or seizure if they wished to comply with the 
Fourth Amendment as conceived by the Court of Appeals.”) 
49  As discussed infra, these practical concerns, and those raised by Justice Kennedy in his concurrence, can be 
better addressed without gutting the protections of the Fourth Amendment for aliens abroad. 
50  See Verdugo-Urquidez, 494 U.S. at 282–83 (Brennan, J., dissenting). 
51  Scholars noted this problem in the immediate wake of Verdugo-Urquidez. See Oppenheim, supra note 9, at 
638; Nicholas, supra note 9, at 295, 299, 306; and Koff, supra note 9, at 461, 471–72. 
52  Verdugo-Urquidez, 494 U.S. at 271. Here, however, even Justice Brennan appears to misread the majority. 
The opinion, after listing a number of cases in which aliens have been found to have rights under the 
Constitution states that “[t]hese cases, however, establish only that aliens receive constitutional protections 
when they have come within the territory of the United States and developed substantial connections with 
the country.” Id. The placement of that “only” is key. The majority does not state that only those who have 
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must be voluntary53 and that he must have undertaken some societal obligations.54 
The only thing the majority makes clear is that an alien who had not been to the 
United States before, and whose presence was of short duration and solely the 
result of an arrest, cannot claim the protections of the Fourth Amendment.55 
This confusion has been demonstrated by the decisions of lower courts, which 
have struggled to apply Verdugo-Urquidez.56 In cases with facts similar to Verdugo-
Urquidez, the application of the substantial connections test has been 
straightforward and easily applied. For example, the Eleventh Circuit,57 First 
Circuit,58 and Ninth Circuit59 have all followed the Supreme Court’s guidance and 
held that searches of non-U.S. citizens conducted outside the United States are not 
covered by the Fourth Amendment when the alien has no ties to the United States. 
District court cases have also followed the plain reading of Verdugo-Urquidez.60 
This relatively straightforward application of Verdugo-Urquidez, however, appears 
to be fairly rare. 
When lower courts have been faced with claims by aliens that they possess 
the necessary connections to the United States, lower courts have struggled to come 
up with a consistent determination of what constitutes a substantial connection.61 
Indeed, no court has purported to come up with a litmus test, leaving each 
individual determination to an ad hoc process. Law enforcement, defense attorneys, 
 
such connections and physical presence can claim the protection of the Constitution. Rather, its use of only 
limits what the cases hold, not to whom they apply. For more on the importance of the placement of the 
word “only” in the sentence see Nat’l Counsel of Resistance of Iran v. Dep’t of State, 251 F.3d 192, 201–02 
(D.C. Cir. 2001). 
53  Verdugo-Urquidez, 494 U.S. at 282. 
54  Id. at 273 (citing INS v. Lopez-Mendoza, 468 U.S. 1032 (1984)) (asserting that the undocumented 
immigrants had “presumably” accepted such obligations). 
55  Also unexplained is why Verdugo-Urquidez’s alleged criminal activities, which involved the importation of a 
substantial amount of narcotics, would not satisfy this requirement. No one has ever suggested that 
criminals are not among “the people” of the United States. Indeed, it would be an odd argument, since the 
vast majority of cases in which the Fourth Amendment would apply would involve criminal activities. 
Moreover, the Fourth Amendment has been found to apply to aliens who have entered the United States 
illegally. See, e.g., Almeida-Sanchez v. United States, 413 U.S. 266, 274 (1973) (holding that the Fourth 
Amendment applied to the search of a vehicle driven by an alien who had entered the United States 
illegally). If their connection is voluntary for purposes of the Fourth Amendment, it is unclear why Verdugo-
Urquidez’s connections would not be. True, his presence was involuntary, but presence in the United States 
is not a pre-requisite to claiming the protection of the Fourth Amendment. Numerous courts have 
recognized that the Fourth Amendment applies to U.S. citizens abroad. See infra note 152. And the Court 
did not distinguish between citizens and aliens with substantial connections—both groups were among “the 
people.” 
56  See Koff, supra note 9, at 456–71 for an analysis of the early circuit confusion applying the test. 
57  United States v. Emmanuel, 565 F.3d 1324 (11th Cir. 2009) (considering the wiretap of Bahamian national 
in the Bahamas). 
58  United States v. Vilches-Navarrete, 523 F.3d 1 (1st Cir. 2008) (considering the search of alien vessel whose 
presence in U.S. was based on need for safe search of vessel). 
59  United States v. Zakharov, 468 F.3d 1171 (9th Cir. 2006) (considering an alien arrested after search of 
vessel on the high seas). 
60  See, e.g., United States v. Gomez Castrillon, 2007 WL 2398810 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 15, 2007) (finding an alien 
with no prior connections to the U.S. has no Fourth Amendment rights regarding wiretaps in Colombia). 
61  See Koff, supra note 9, at 456–71. 
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and courts themselves are left adrift in a sea of uncertainty about whether a 
particular search requires a warrant. In some circuits, aliens with seemingly 
significant ties are found to have no substantial connections, while in others with 
seemingly ephemeral or fleeting ties are found to be protected by the Fourth 
Amendment. Even within circuits, different courts have come to radically different 
conclusions. 
The Ninth Circuit, for example, found that being a student at an American 
university, even if outside the United States at the time of the challenge, 
established substantial connections.62 On the other hand, the Northern District of 
California determined that a man with twelve years of residency, marriage to a 
resident alien, a four-year-old American citizen child, a California driver’s license, 
payment of traffic tickets, ten years living in California communities, and payment 
of sales taxes established familial ties, but not substantial connections with the 
United States.63 
The D.C. Circuit has held that a non-profit organization with an office and a 
small bank account in the United States has established substantial connections.64 
Meanwhile, the District Court for the District of Columbia held that regular visits 
to the United States to visit an ill daughter and granddaughter did not rise to the 
level of a substantial connection.65 
A district court in Texas found that an alien who made “regular trips” into 
the United States each month and had been issued a “border crossing card” had 
established such connections.66 But a Wisconsin district court found that regular 
visits, telephone calls and online chats with over a dozen family members and 
friends, numerous visits to family over fifteen years, numerous business contacts, 
and other assorted connections did not satisfy Verdugo-Urquidez.67 
There is so little guidance provided to lower courts that some courts have 
split within the same decision as to whether an alien’s ties are substantial. In 
United States v. Portillo-Munoz, two judges believed that having a job, paying rent 
for eighteen months, and supporting a family did not provide substantial 
connections.68 Judge Dennis dissented, finding that these same ties met the 
Verdugo-Urquidez test.69 The Court of Appeals for the Armed Forces also faced a 
similar split in United States v. Ali.70 The majority found that a week of pre-
 
62  Ibrahim v. United States Dep’t of Homeland Security, 669 F.3d 983 (9th Cir. 2012). 
63  United States v. Guitterez, 1997 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 16446 (N.D. Cal. Oct. 16, 1997), vacated, 983 F.Supp. 905 
(N.D. Cal. 1998), rev’d without opinion 203 F.3d 833 (9th Cir. 1999). But see De Leon v. Reno, 1998 WL 
289321 (N.D. Cal. March 26, 1998) (finding that four years’ residency, including more than a year since 
previous illegal entry established substantial connections). This also ignores the fact that the searches in 
Guitterez and De Leon were domestic, rather than foreign searches, an issue discussed in more detail below. 
64  Nat’l Council of Resistance of Iran v. Dep’t of State, 251 F.3d 192 (D.C. Cir. 2001). 
65  American Immigration Lawyer Ass’n v. Reno, 18 F. Supp. 2d 38 (D.D.C. 1998). 
66  Martinez-Aguero v. Gonzales, 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 2412 *65 (W.D. Tex. Feb. 2, 2005). 
67  United States v. Baboolal, 2006 WL 1674480 (E.D. Wis. June 16, 2006). 
68  643 F.3d 437 (5th Cir. 2011). 
69  Id. at 442–43 (Dennis, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part). 
70  71 M.J. 256 (C.A.A.F. 2012). 
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deployment training at Fort Benning, Georgia, and employment with a U.S. 
contractor outside the United States did not establish substantial connections. The 
concurrence held that service with the armed forces in the uniform of the United 
States was a substantial connection.71 
This is to say nothing of the fact that many courts have applied the 
substantial connections test to searches that take place within the territorial 
boundaries of the United States. Nothing in Verdugo-Urquidez indicated that its 
analysis should apply to a domestic search. However, courts are divided even on 
this seemingly easy question. The Northern District of California has limited 
Verdugo-Urquidez to its facts and held that it is inappropriate to look for 
substantial connections when an alien is within the U.S.72 The District of Arizona, 
however, still relied on the substantial connections test to judge a challenge to a 
warrant executed in the United States.73 As part of this confusion regarding 
Verdugo-Urquidez’s application to domestic searches, courts have differed on 
whether undocumented aliens can claim to have substantial connections at all.74 
The Northern District of California has held that such individuals can establish 
substantial connections.75 A district court in Utah also held that such individuals 
can establish substantial connections.76 However, other courts have held that 
undocumented immigrants can never claim the protections of the Constitution.77 
Judges have further divided on whether the so-called “entry fiction” operates 
to prevent application of the Fourth Amendment to aliens who are physically 
present in the United States, but have not been admitted.78 Three cases have found 
that the entry fiction does not apply to excessive force claims under the Fourth 
Amendment, because mere presence is enough of a connection.79 But at least one 
 
71  Id. at 277–78 (Baker, J., concurring). 
72  United States v. Guitterez, 983 F. Supp. 905 (N.D. Cal. 1998), rev’d without opinion, 203 F.3d 833 (9th Cir. 
1999). The Court sua sponte reconsidered its earlier decision in United States v. Guitterez, 1997 U.S. Dist. 
LEXIS 16446 (N.D. Cal. Oct. 14, 1997), in which it had determined Mr. Guitterez lacked substantial 
connections. 
73  United States v. Alahmedalabdaloklah, 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 102740 (D. Ariz. July 3, 2017) (denying 
challenge to 2703(d) requirements for court order because the storage of the content of electronic 
communications on servers located in the United States cannot justify extending Fourth Amendment 
protections to a person who does not have substantial connections to the United States). 
74  Scholars predicted this outcome shortly after Verdugo-Urquidez was decided. Nicholas, supra note 9, at 308. 
75  See De Leon, 1998 WL 289321. 
76  United States v. Atienzo, 2005 WL 3334758 (D. Utah Dec. 7, 2005). 
77  See, e.g., United States v. Boffil-Rivera, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 84633 (S.D. Fla. Aug. 12, 2008). 
78  The “entry fiction,” created by Shaughnessy v. Mezei, 345 U.S. 206 (1953), holds that “an alien on the 
threshold of initial entry” stands on a different footing than one who has entered the United States, either 
legally or illegally, even if the unadmitted alien is physically present in the United States. Under this 
fiction, the arrival at a port of entry, although physically within the United States, does not qualify as 
entering the country. Thus, a search of an alien would be considered extraterritorial. This status follows the 
alien even if they are “paroled” into the United States pending determination of admissibility. See Leng 
May Ma v. Barber, 357 U.S. 185, 187 (1958). 
79  United States v. Parker, 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 4764 (N.D. Ala. Jan. 13, 2016); Castro v. Cabrera, 742 F.3d 
595 (5th Cir. 2014); Martinez-Aguero v. Gonzales, 459 F.3d 618 (5th Cir. 2006). 
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judge has opined that the entry fiction applies and treats aliens as if they are not 
present in the United States.80 
Finally, courts have divided over whether the term “the people,” as discussed 
in Verdugo-Urquidez, is the same for all purposes. For example, two courts have 
found that the term as used in the Fourth Amendment covers a different group than 
the identical term in the Second Amendment.81 This runs directly counter to the 
majority’s textual analysis, which depended on the identical nature of the term to 
justify denying aliens the protection of the Fourth Amendment.82 Other courts, 
however, have found that the use of the phrase in both amendments is identical; 
thus, the substantial connections test governs whether an alien has rights under 
the Second Amendment.83 
Over time, the majority’s reasoning in Verdugo-Urquidez has proven to 
provide little guidance to lower courts, just as Justice Brennan predicted in his 
dissent. Litigants, law enforcement officers, and judges lack any method to 
determine if a particular set of connections will be sufficient to warrant the 
protections of the Fourth Amendment. For law enforcement officers, the lack of an 
ex ante rule risks the success of a criminal prosecution. If they judge an alien’s ties 
to be insufficient, and fail to seek a warrant, they could see valuable evidence 
suppressed. For litigants, the lack of an ex post standard makes trial and appeal 
strategies uncertain at best. It is not clear if courts will entertain a motion to 
suppress even in a case involving a domestic search. And for judges, the lack of 
guidance leaves them adrift, unable to determine if their decisions on the necessity 
of a warrant, the reasonableness of a search, or lack thereof, will be upheld on 
appeal. The law demands more. 
B. The “Substantial Connections” Test Has Been Repeatedly Applied in 
Unintended Areas Without Sufficient Justification 
Another reason to reconsider the reasoning of the majority’s opinion in 
Verdugo-Urquidez is that it has been repeatedly extended to other amendments by 
lower courts without a textual basis.84 While the Court may have failed to provide 
any clear guidance about what constitutes “substantial connections,” it was clear 
 
80  Rosales-Garcia v. Holland, 238 F.3d 704, 735 (6th Cir. 2001) (Rice, J., dissenting). 
81  United States v. Meza, 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 50485 (E.D. Wis. Feb. 25, 2014) (finding that the Second 
Amendment did not apply to aliens “illegally present” in the United States); United States v. Portillo-
Munoz, 643 F.3d 437, 440 (5th Cir. 2011) (“Moreover, even if there were precedent for the proposition that 
illegal aliens generally are covered by the Fourth Amendment, we do not find that the use of ‘the people’ in 
both the Second and the Fourth Amendment mandates a holding that the two amendments cover exactly 
the same groups of people.”). 
82  If the term “the people” can mean different things in different places within the Constitution, then its use in 
the Preamble and Article I provides no guidance whatsoever in interpreting the meaning of the Fourth 
Amendment. In that case, another argument made by Justice Brennan, that the term was a rhetorical 
flourish to contrast “the people” with “the government,” becomes much more persuasive. 
83  See, e.g., United States v. Mesa-Rodriguez, 798 F.3d 664 (7th Cir. 2015) (finding that the Second and Fourth 
Amendments should be read together and that twenty years presence, attending school, close relationships 
with family and others, and sporadic employment constituted substantial connections). 
84  See infra notes 87–95 discussion and accompanying text. 
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that the reason they were needed is due to the specific language of the Fourth 
Amendment. Thus, a proper extension of Verdugo-Urquidez would be limited to 
constitutional provisions which contain the words “the people,” since it was this 
language which caused the Court to limit the Fourth Amendment’s reach.85 
However, many lower courts have applied the “substantial connections” test to 
constitutional provisions which have nothing in common with the Fourth 
Amendment and which do not invoke the term “the people.”86 
Whatever one thinks about Chief Justice Rehnquist’s textual exegesis, it was 
a key component to the reasoning of the Court, since it was the basis of the 
“substantial connections” test. Verdugo-Urquidez was not entitled to the protections 
of the Fourth Amendment because he was not among “the people” whose rights the 
amendment was designed to protect. One would expect that the reasoning of 
Verdugo-Urquidez would only apply to those Amendments which use that term.87 
But lower courts have treated the “substantial connections” test as the test for the 
extraterritorial application of the Constitution, applying it to provisions which 
nowhere mention “the people,” including to the Fifth and Sixth Amendments, which 
not only use broader terms, such as “person” and “the accused,” but which the 
majority specifically differentiated for that reason. 
Despite the Court’s reliance on the specific text of the Fourth Amendment, 
lower courts have applied the logic of Verdugo-Urquidez to claims under the Due 
Process Clauses of the Fifth88 and Fourteenth89 Amendments, the Takings Clause of 
the Fifth Amendment,90 the right to jury trial under the Sixth91 and Seventh92 
Amendments, the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment,93 and 
Article I, Section 9 Clauses 294 and 395 of the Constitution. Indeed, it is safe to say 
that the logic of Verdugo-Urquidez has been applied incorrectly almost as often as it 
has been properly used.96 Courts have identified a variety of reasons to extend the 
 
85  At least one scholar predicted that lower courts may “greatly expand the holding” beyond the parameters 
set by the Court. Oppenheimer, supra note 9, at 622. 
86  See infra notes 87–95. 
87  As noted earlier, this would include portions of the First, Second, Fourth, Ninth, and Tenth Amendments. 
88  Al-Marri v. Wright, 487 F.3d 160 (4th Cir. 2007); Do Rosario Veiga v. World Meteorological Org., 568 F. 
Supp. 2d 367 (S.D.N.Y. 2008); United States v. Ali, 71 M.J. 256 (C.A.A.F. 2012). 
89  Do Rosario Veiga, 568 F. Supp. 3d 367. 
90  Al-Qaisi v. United States, 103 Fed. Cl. 439 (2012); Doe v. United States, 95 Fed. Cl. 546 (2010); 
Atamirzayeva v. United States, 524 F.3d 1320 (Fed. Cir. 2008); Atamirzayeva v. United States, 77 Fed. Cl. 
378 (2007); Rosner v. United States, 231 F. Supp. 2d 1202 (S.D. Fla. 2002); Ashkir v. United States, 46 Fed. 
Cl. 438 (2000). 
91  United States v. Ali, 71 M.J. 256 (C.A.A.F. 2012). 
92  Do Rosario Veiga, 568 F. Supp. 3d 367. 
93  Rosales v. Battle, 113 Cal. App. 4th Supp. 1178 (Ct. App. Dep’t Super. Ct. 2003). 
94  See Osorio-Martinez v. Attorney Gen., 893 F.3d 153, 166, 168 (3rd Cir. 2018); Castro v. United States Dep’t 
of Homeland Sec., 835 F.3d 422, 434, 448 (3rd Cir. 2016). 
95  Arbelaez v. Newcomb, 1 Fed. App’x. 1, 1 (D.C. Cir. 2001) (per curiam). 
96  But see Lamont v. Woods, 948 F.2d 825, 834–35 (2d Cir. 1991) (relying on the analytical framework of 
Verdugo-Urquidez, looking to: (1) the operation and text of the provision; (2) history; and (3) likely 
consequences of applying it extraterritorially, but rejecting application of substantial connections because 
the Establishment Clause does not apply to “the people”); Lopez v. Mineta, No. B-01-208, 2002 U.S. Dist. 
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“substantial connections” test to other constitutional provisions, but by far the most 
common is reliance on the Court’s dicta that “[t]hese cases . . . establish only that 
aliens receive constitutional protections when they have come within the territory of 
the United States and developed substantial connections with this country.”97  
Reliance on this dictum is inappropriate for three reasons. First, lower courts 
have treated this language as if it held that only aliens with substantial connections 
may claim the Constitution’s protection. But that is not what Chief Justice 
Rehnquist wrote. In responding to claims by Verdugo-Urquidez that the Court had 
issued several decisions applying the Constitution to aliens, the majority held that 
those cases did no more than recognize rights for aliens with substantial ties. But it 
did not state that those were the only conditions upon which the Constitution could 
be invoked by aliens. Nor could it; in a line of cases under the Due Process Clause, it 
is the very lack of connections which prevent states from haling foreign corporations 
into their courts.98 Thus, if substantial ties were a necessary pre-condition to 
invoking constitutional protections, particularly the Due Process Clause, these 
cases would all have to be overturned. 
Second, the “substantial connections” test itself arises from the use of the 
phrase “the people” in the Fourth Amendment.99 As noted above, the application of 
the substantial connections test makes no sense if the right claimed is not one 
promised to “the people.” Thus, the dicta does not logically flow from the reasoning 
that precedes it. 
Third, the cases the majority lumps together and dismisses do not stand for 
that proposition in the first place. While it is true that four of the cases dealt with 
resident aliens,100 two of them did not.101 Plyler v. Doe found that illegal aliens could 
claim the protection of the Equal Protection Clause.102 If the decisions by some 
lower courts that illegal aliens can never develop “substantial connections”103 were 
 
LEXIS 27264 (S.D. Tex. 2002) (refusing to extend Verdugo-Urquidez to Fifth Amendment claims of Due 
Process and Equal Protection); Nursing Home Pension Fund v. Oracle Corp., No. C01-00988 MJJ, 2007 U.S. 
Dist. LEXIS 49851 (N.D. Cal. 1997) (refusing to apply Verdugo-Urquidez to the self-incrimination clause of 
the Fifth Amendment). 
97  See Castro v. United States Dep’t of Homeland Sec., 835 F.3d at 448 (explicitly noting it was relying on 
dicta); Al-Marri v. Wright, 487 F.3d 160, 174 (4th Cir. 2007); Arbelaez v. Newcomb, 1 Fed. App’x. at 2; Veiga 
v. World Meteorological Org., 568 F. Supp. 2d at 374; United States v. Ali, 71 M.J. 256, 267 (C.A.A.F. 2012); 
Rosales v. Battle, 113 Cal. App. 4th at 1186.  
98  See Daimler v. Bauman, 134 S. Ct. 746, 768 (2014); Goodyear Dunlop Tires Operations v. Brown, 564 U.S. 
915, 920 (2011); J. McIntyre Machinery. v. Nicastro, 564 U.S. 873 (2011); Asahi Metal Indus. Co. Ltd. v. 
California, 480 U.S. 102, 122 (1987); Helicopteros Nacionales de Columbia v. Hall, 466 U.S. 408, 428 (1984); 
Insurance Corp. of Ireland v. Compagnie Des Bauxites de Guinee, 456 U.S. 694 (1982); Perkins v. Benguet 
Consol. Mining Co., 342 U.S. 437, 444 (1952). 
99  See supra Part II. 
100  Kwong Hai Chew v. Colding, 344 U.S. 590, 592 (1953); Bridges v. Wixon, 326 U.S. 135, 161 (1945); Wong 
Wing v. United States, 163 U.S. 228, 230 (1896); Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356, 358 (1886). 
101  See Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 202 (1982) (dealing with illegal aliens); Russian Volunteer Fleet v. United 
States, 282 U.S. 481, 487 (1931) (dealing with a Russian corporation). 
102  Plyler, 457 U.S. at 212. 
103  See United States v. Boffil-Rivera, No. 08-20437-CR-GRAHAM/TORRES, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 84633 
(S.D. Fla. 2008); United States v. Esparza-Mendoza, 265 F. Supp. 2d 1254, 1261 (D. Utah 2003). 
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correct, this case could not possibly stand for the proposition that only aliens with 
substantial ties can claim constitutional protections.104 But even assuming those 
decisions are incorrect, Plyler did not differentiate between illegal aliens who had 
been here for years and those who had just crossed the border. 
Russian Volunteer Fleet is even harder to square with the Chief Justice’s 
pronouncement. A Russian corporation brought suit against the United States 
under the Fifth Amendment’s Takings Clause, seeking recompense for two ships it 
had commissioned that were seized by the U.S. Shipping Board Emergency Fleet 
Corporation.105 So far as the record discloses, this shipbuilding contract was the 
only connection between the Russian corporation and the United States. There was 
no allegation that the Russian Volunteer Fleet had a physical presence in the 
United States, aside from its appearance, through counsel, in U.S. courts. Yet the 
Supreme Court held that if the Act of June 15, 1917—which authorized the seizure 
of the ships—denied the Russian corporation just compensation, it would be 
unconstitutional.106 Thus, the case does not stand for the proposition assigned to it. 
In the case of the Takings Clause, the Court of Federal Claims has relied on a 
different rationale, one which explicitly rejects the textual basis of Verdugo-
Urquidez.107 The court summarized the arguments in favor of applying the 
“substantial connections” test as follows: 
(1) “the ‘substantial connections’ rationale employed in Verdugo-
Urquidez, Johnson and other cases does not hinge on the specific 
language of any amendment, but rather on an overarching construct 
of the limited extraterritoriality of the Constitution, and, in particular, 
the Bill of Rights”; (2) “some courts and commentators have surmised 
that since the ‘substantial connections’ requirement bars the defensive 
assertion of constitutional rights, as a shield, by aliens haled into U.S. 
courts and subjected to criminal prosecution, it certainly must bar 
offensive assertions of constitutional rights, as a sword, by 
nonresident aliens voluntarily seeking redress in civil proceedings”; 
and (3) “although not always identified as such, the ‘substantial 
connections’ requirement is well-evidenced in numerous cases 
involving takings claims.”108 
None of these reasons stands up to scrutiny. 
The first proposition cannot be squared with the majority’s holding in 
Verdugo-Urquidez. The textual analysis is key to the creation of the “substantial 
connections” test, for the reasons outlined above. The test finds no other hook 
 
104  The better reading is that Boffil-Rivera and Esparza-Mendoza are wrongly decided. 
105  Russian Volunteer Fleet, 282 U.S. at 487. 
106  Id. at 489 (holding that the only condition for claiming constitutional protection was the corporation’s status 
as an “alien friend”). 
107  Ashkir v. United States, 46 Fed. Cl. 438, 443 (2000). 
108  Atamirzayeva v. United States, 77 Fed. Cl. 378, 385 (2007) (summarizing Judge Allegra’s holdings in 
Ashkir). 
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anywhere within the Constitution. Ironically, Judge Allegra specifically notes that 
the Court relied on the textual exegesis of the phrase “the people”109 and yet still 
applies the “substantial connections” test to a clause without the phrase. As for the 
structural argument, it runs counter the expressed will of the Framers to create a 
government of limited powers. Properly conceived, the Bill of Rights, despite its 
name, does not create any positive rights among the people. Rather, it provides 
further limits on the enumerated powers in the Constitution. Thus, while a narrow 
reading of the Articles may be appropriate, an expansive reading of the Bill of 
Rights is more true to the Founders’ intentions. 
The second proposition, while tempting, presupposes that the Bill of Rights 
cannot be used as a shield, which is not entirely correct. As noted above, foreign 
corporations routinely claim the shield of the Due Process Clause to prevent 
liability in U.S. courts when they lack sufficient connections to the United States. 
Furthermore, it is not clear to me that attempting to invoke the Fifth Amendment’s 
Takings Clause would qualify as using the Bill of Rights as a sword–a claim only 
lies when the Federal Government first takes the affirmative step of taking 
property without compensation. Thus, even if it were correct to say that aliens 
should not be allowed to use the Bill of Rights as a sword, it would not justify 
denying the extraterritorial reach of the Takings Clause. Finally, even if Judge 
Allegra is correct and the Takings Clause should not always apply abroad, he does 
not explain why the “substantial connections” test is the appropriate way to 
determine if an alien has rights under this clause. 
As for the last proposition, Judge Allegra found that the “substantial 
connections” test, although not explicitly named, underlies Takings Claims either 
through the citizenship or residency of the claimant, or the location of the property 
within the United States. While it is true that most claims under the Takings 
Clause meet at least one of these two tests, it ignores Turney v. United States, a 
decision in which the court recognized a claim by a citizen of the Philippines for a 
taking of radar equipment in that country.110 In fact, prior to Ashkir, the Court of 
Claims had never rejected a Takings Claim simply on the basis that both the 
property and the claimant had no ties to the United States.111 
Simply put, there is no basis, in text or logic, for applying the reasoning of 
Verdugo-Urquidez, to clauses of the Constitution which do not use the term “the 
people.” While some might argue that the term applies to the whole document by 
virtue of the fact that it is “the people” who ordain and establish the Constitution, 
this argument was implicitly rejected by the Verdugo-Urquidez majority when it 
distinguished the language of the Fifth and Sixth Amendments from that of the 
Fourth. Furthermore, Justice Kennedy, whose vote was necessary for the majority’s 
 
109  Ashkir, 46 Fed. Cl. at 443. 
110  115 F. Supp. at 458, 465 (1953). 
111  Even if the substantial connections test did apply, it would seem that having your land or property taken by 
the U.S. government is a fairly substantial connection. 
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reasoning, explicitly noted that the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment 
would apply to the defendant in his concurring opinion.112 
The misuse of the Verdugo-Urquidez analysis is particularly troubling for 
cases decided after the Supreme Court’s decision in Boumediene v. Bush, which 
replaces the “substantial connections” test with the far more functional 
“impracticable and anomalous” test.113 Justice Kennedy discussed this test, 
borrowed from the controlling opinion in Reid v. Covert, in his Verdugo-Urquidez 
concurrence.114 In Boumediene, authored by Justice Kennedy, he secured five votes 
to make this test the appropriate means of determining if a specific constitutional 
provision applies abroad. Under this test, the Court rejects a “rigid and abstract 
rule” for determining where constitutional guarantees extend.115 Instead, it takes 
from the Insular Cases the lesson that “whether a constitutional provision has 
extraterritorial effect depends upon the ‘particular circumstances, the practical 
necessities, and the possible alternatives which Congress had before it’ and, in 
particular, whether judicial enforcement of the provision would be ‘impracticable 
and anomalous.’”116 Tellingly, unlike Verdugo-Urquidez, who was a criminal 
defendant, the detainees at Guantanamo Bay were suspected of being illegal enemy 
combatants, waging war against the United States. The Court found that, per the 
terms of the lease with Cuba, the United States exercised “complete jurisdiction and 
control” of the naval base.117 The Court rejected the idea that formal notions of 
sovereignty governed the application of the Constitution abroad. 
The Boumediene majority cites Verdugo-Urquidez only two times, both cites 
to Justice Kennedy’s concurrence in that case.118 In deciding that alleged enemy 
combatants were protected by the Suspension Clause of the Constitution, the 
Boumediene majority did not cite their connections (or lack thereof) even once. The 
majority does not even acknowledge that the “substantial connections” test plays a 
role in determining the extraterritorial reach of the Constitution. This is 
particularly noteworthy in light of the fact that Justice Scalia cites to Verdugo-
Urquidez in his dissent for the proposition that “[t]here is simply no support for the 
Court’s assertion that constitutional rights extend to aliens held outside U.S. 
sovereign territory.”119 The majority fails to respond to this point.120 While not a 
direct repudiation of Verdugo-Urquidez, Boumediene rejected the notion that a 
 
112  United States v. Verdugo-Urquidez, 494 U.S. 259, 278 (1990) (Kennedy, J., concurring) (“All would agree, 
for instance, that the dictates of the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment protect the defendant.”). 
113  Boumediene v. Bush, 553 U.S. 723, 759–60, 770 (2008). 
114  Verdugo-Urquidez, 494 U.S. at 277–78 (Kennedy, J., concurring). 
115  Reid v. Covert, 354 U.S. 1, 74 (1957) (Harlan, J., concurring).  
116  Boumediene, 553 U.S. at 759 (quoting Reid, 354 U.S. at 74–75 (Harlan, J., concurring)). 
117  Id. at 771. 
118  Id. at 759, 760–62 (noting that if In re Ross were decided on citizenship grounds, Reid would have had to 
overturn it, which Justices Harlan and Frankfurter were unwilling to do). 
119  Id. at 841 (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
120  The Court does not even go so far as to state in a footnote that the test is inapplicable because Guantanamo 
Bay shares significant features of sovereign U.S. territory. 
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substantial connection with the United States is a necessary precondition to invoke 
the protections of the Constitution. 
Thus, it would appear that in the wake of Boumediene, lower courts should be 
applying the “impracticable and anomalous” test; but that has not been the case.121 
The fact that lower courts continue to rely on the “substantial connections” test is 
further evidence that it is time the test was officially and explicitly replaced. What 
that replacement should look like is the subject of the next section. 
III. A BETTER WAY TO CONCEPTUALIZE THE EXTRATERRITORIAL FOURTH 
AMENDMENT 
There are two potential means of dealing with the above-identified problems: 
1) more clearly define the “substantial connections test,” and 2) scrap the test 
entirely and replace it with something else. I explore both possibilities in this part. 
While I conclude that replacing the “substantial connections” test is the best way to 
move forward, I also recognize that until the Supreme Court does so, lower courts 
may be constrained and have so far indicated an inclination to continue to embrace 
the test. Lower courts could rely on the intervening precedent in Boumediene to 
shift focus to the “impracticable and anomalous” test as opposed to the “substantial 
connections” test, while still maintaining fidelity to the hierarchical nature of the 
judiciary. 
However, this would only solve half the problem. Under the “impracticable 
and anomalous” test, courts would apply the Fourth Amendment to all those 
present within the geographic boundaries of the United States, without regard to 
connections, as the Court held that the Suspension Clause applied in U.S.-
controlled Guantanamo Bay, despite the lack of connections any of the prisoners 
there had with the United States. On the other hand, Justice Kennedy already 
relied on this test to hold that those outside the United States are not entitled to the 
protections of the Fourth Amendment.122 This has the benefit of a clear rule, which 
courts and law enforcement can apply, but it fails to provide guidance on other 
Amendments. The test also fails to address the rights of U.S. citizens, and aliens 
with substantial connections, however defined, who are abroad.123   Given this, I 
propose a better way for lower courts to apply the test that provides more 
predictability for all parties. 
A. Defining “Substantial Connections” 
While Chief Justice Rehnquist found the term “the people” required the use 
of the “substantial connections test,” the content of the test arises from the 
statement in Johnson v. Eisentrager that aliens are “accorded a generous and 
 
121  See Osorio-Martinez v. Attorney Gen., 893 F.3d 153, 167, 177 (3rd Cir. 2018); United States v. Portillo-
Munoz, 643 F.3d 437, 443, 445 (5th Cir. 2011); United States v. Emmanuel, 565 F.3d 1324, 1331 (11th Cir. 
2009); United States v. Alahmedalabdaloklah, No. CR-12-01263-PHX-NVW, 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 102740 
(D. Ariz. 2017); Doe v. United States, 95 Fed. Cl. 546, 567 (2010). 
122  United States v. Verdugo-Urquidez, 494 U.S. 259, 277–78 (1990). 
123  See Boumediene v. Bush, 553 U.S. 723, 759 (2008).   
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ascending scale of rights as he increases his identity with our society.”124 Thus, an 
alien’s connection with the United States can be conceived of as a continuum 
running from absolutely no connections on one end to being a lawful permanent 
resident on the other.125 Somewhere on that continuum, an alien achieves sufficient 
connections to be considered one of “the people” entitled to the protections of the 
Fourth Amendment—but where? 
In order to appropriately judge when someone has developed “substantial 
connections” courts should look to both the quality and quantity of connections. 
Certain connections, based on their quality, should automatically qualify as 
substantial for Fourth Amendment purposes. Others may need to be aggregated in 
order to achieve the level of “substantial connections.” Based on the language of 
Verdugo-Urquidez, one such connection is voluntary presence in the United 
States.126 Since we are dealing with extraterritorial searches, presence seems like 
an odd factor to consider in the first place. But one lesson we can draw from this is 
that the voluntary nature of the connection is key. 
Assuming presence is a requirement, for purposes of searches within the 
United States, voluntary presence should be enough.127 After all, Verdugo-Urquidez 
concerned itself only with the question of extraterritorial searches. It said nothing 
about searches, of aliens or others, within the borders of the United States. Given 
this, it seems odd to focus on presence at all. 
Presence is voluntary even if it does not follow all the niceties of the 
Immigration and Nationality Act. All that is required is an independent decision to 
enter the country. Thus, even those aliens who lack appropriate documentation are 
capable of forming connections with this country that are every bit as substantial as 
those formed by citizens. The Supreme Court has recognized as much when it held 
that undocumented children were entitled to a public education.128 Furthermore, 
undocumented immigrants get married to citizens and have children who are 
citizens. Family ties are some of the most substantial ties a person can form. 
Nothing about an alien’s immigration status affects the substance of these ties. 
Thus, having citizens within the close family network should be recognized as a 
substantial connection with the United States.129 
 
124  For a study of the truth of this particular statement, see Won Kidane, Alien Spectrum Disorder: The Bill of 
Rights from Chinese Exclusion to Guantanamo, 20 BERKELEY LA RAZA L. J. 89 (2010). 
125  The only more significant connection that can be had is citizenship, at which point the alien is no longer an 
alien. 
126  Verdugo-Urquidez, 494 U.S. at 271.  
127  Involuntary presence, such as being transported to the United States for trial, likely gives rise to other 
exceptions, such as searches incident to arrest or the sorts of safety searches that prisons and jails are 
allowed to conduct. 
128  Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 230 (1982). 
129  At the very least, such ties should create a rebuttable presumption of substantial connections. I can 
envision a scenario in which someone enters the United States, legally or not, impregnates a citizen and 
leaves the country, never to be seen again. Despite having a citizen child, presuming the baby is carried to 
term, this individual would not have a substantial connection with either the child or the country. In this 
case, ties to the family and ties to the country would be synonymous. 
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Not every connection will be significant, or even necessarily contribute. For 
example, contrary to the Ninth Circuit’s holding in Ibrahim v. Department of 
Homeland Security, it’s not clear to me that attendance at a college should qualify. 
In most states, residents pay less tuition than out-of-state students. But nearly 
every state with differential tuition refuses to count time pursuing an education 
toward state residency.130 Thus, an alien who is only here to pursue an education 
likely cannot show a substantial connection to the United States or to any of them. 
This is not to say that education could not be part of a broader pattern, but taken 
alone they cannot create a substantial connection. In the context of an 
extraterritorial search, the alien would have severed ties with the United States by 
returning to their home country.131 Thus, these connections could be properly 
characterized as fleeting. 
This brings up another question courts will have to deal with when making 
this determination—the age of the connection. Are connections durable? Is it 
enough to establish a connection once and then rely on it years later, even if those 
connections are not maintained? Let us assume that education qualified as a 
substantial connection; does someone who graduated in 1990 then returned home to 
a foreign country still qualify for Fourth Amendment protections today, or have 
they surrendered those connections?132 On the other hand, older connections that 
have been maintained are necessarily deeper than recently formed ones. 
Based on the above, we can discern a framework for determining if an alien 
has formed substantial connections with this country so as to be entitled to the 
protections of the Fourth Amendment. By definition, this is going to be a case-by-
case analysis and highly fact dependent. But one can lay out some markers to help 
guide courts faced with this difficult question, which is more than the Court did in 
Verdugo-Urquidez. 
First, the court must determine if the alien’s connections to the United States 
are voluntary. If the connections are not voluntary, that is the end of the inquiry 
and the Fourth Amendment does not apply.133 Second, the court should look to the 
depth or quality of the connection. Familial relationships are deep, as is the 
commitment to defending this country inherent in military service. Education alone 
is temporary and thus fleeting. Third, the court should look to the age of the 
 
130  See, e.g., In-State Tuition and State Residency Requirements, FINAID, 
http://www.finaid.org/otheraid/stateresidency.phtml (last visited Feb. 1, 2020) (“Most states have 
established residency requirements designed to prevent out-of-state students who become residents 
incidental to their education from qualifying.”). 
131  This would not be the case during temporary breaks from schools, but an alien, who has completed (or 
abandoned) their education and returned home, lacks substantial connections to the United States. 
132  These are not easy questions by any means. Under the Court’s test, a U.S. citizen is automatically a 
member of “the people” even if they have lived overseas for years. So long as they maintain their 
citizenship, they would be protected by the Fourth Amendment. What’s more, the child of two U.S. citizens 
who is born abroad and has never set foot in the United States would still qualify under the Court’s test, 
because citizenship is the ultimate connection, but presence is not required to acquire citizenship if both 
parents are U.S. citizens. 
133  This is consistent with the Court’s holding in Verdugo-Urquidez that being prosecuted by the United States 
does not, in itself, provide a substantial connection. Verdugo-Urquidez, 494 U.S. at 271-72. 
2020] Rethinking the Reasoning of Verdugo-Urquidez 259 
 
connection. Older, sustained connections should be given more weight than recent 
ones.134 At the same time, even substantial connections may grow stale such that 
they no longer demonstrate ties to this country. A rough baseline of five years 
without maintaining a connection should present a rebuttable presumption that the 
alien no longer has sufficient ties. 
Finally, courts should restrict these considerations solely to the Amendments 
that use the phrase “the people.” The Fifth and Sixth Amendment, which use 
broader language, should be treated appropriately. Other clauses which do not 
contain the phrase “the people” do not limit themselves to the political community 
that requires a substantial connection to invoke their protections. Thus, the 
presumption in those cases should be that those provisions apply to aliens, 
regardless of their connections to the United States. Similarly, courts should 
presume that identical language requires identical treatment. Thus, the Second 
Amendment’s protections should be co-extensive with the Fourth Amendment’s 
protections. 
With this new framework in place, courts can begin to create a consistent 
standard for determining when an alien has achieved a sufficient connection under 
Verdugo-Urquidez. This will still require ad hoc determinations and close cases. It 
is far easier is to establish a bright line, but this cannot be done by clinging to the 
“substantial connections” test. I offer such a bright line test in the next section. 
B. An Alternative Framework 
Far better than even a well-defined ad hoc test is a clear bright line test–one 
that asks a single question with an easily ascertained answer: is the search 
conducted by U.S. agents engaged in enforcing U.S. criminal laws? This test focuses 
not on who is being searched, but rather who is doing the searching. I agree with 
the mutuality theory relied upon by Justice Brennan135 that there can be no valid 
exercise of U.S. government power without a corollary extension of the limits on 
that power.136 
Under this view, the Constitution does not apply to some “undefined, 
limitless class” of people, a concern of Justice Kennedy.137 Instead, it is a very well 
defined and delimited population: U.S. agents engaged in enforcement of the 
criminal laws of the United States outside our borders.138 This would not overly 
 
134  This is not a hard and fast rule. The birth of a U.S. citizen child will be substantial even if the child is 
recently born, provided the alien shows an intent to be involved in the child’s life. 
135  Verdugo-Urquidez, 494 U.S. at 297 (Blackmun, J., dissenting). 
136  An alternative formulation is that the Fourth Amendment’s reach is co-terminus with the application of 
United States sovereign power. Thus, it is the government agents conducting the search who carry the 
Fourth Amendment with them. A similar argument was made by Koff, supra note 9, at 488–89. 
137  Verdugo-Urquidez, 494 U.S. at 275 (Kennedy, J., concurring). 
138  I do not here address the thornier question of whether those exercising military power would be limited by 
the Fourth Amendment. Courts have traditionally held that the Fourth Amendment does not apply on the 
field of battle, although it has been held to apply to the search of a U.S. citizen’s apartment by military 
forces in occupied Vienna. See Best v. United States, 184 F.2d 131 (1st Cir. 1950). In that case, the Court 
concluded the search was reasonable. Furthermore, in Boumediene, the Court held that the Suspension 
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extend current law. Virtually all criminal prosecutions within U.S. boundaries are 
currently covered by the Fourth Amendment,139 as are searches of U.S. citizens 
abroad, when conducted by U.S. agents or with their substantial participation.140 
The extension I favor is actually relatively modest and extremely straightforward. 
Furthermore, it would respect the underlying nature of the Constitution as a grant 
of limited powers to the Government. It would also be consistent with the 
interpretation of other criminal procedure amendments, such as the Fifth and Sixth 
Amendments, which apply to all criminal defendants regardless of citizenship and 
location.141 
Alternatively, one could also extend the protections against unreasonable 
search and seizures to aliens abroad as a component of Due Process, as protected by 
the Fifth Amendment. Outside of the war context, the Supreme Court has never 
held that the Due Process Clause does not apply to aliens outside the United 
States.142 Justice Kennedy noted in his concurrence that no one would dispute the 
application of the Due Process Clause to Verdugo-Urquidez himself.143 
The Supreme Court has relied on due process to extend other protections of 
the Bill of Rights in other contexts. The most obvious of these is the incorporation of 
the Bill of Rights to the states via the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth 
Amendment.144 The Amendments do not apply to the states of their own force, but 
the Court has held that the Due Process Clause contains those rights and applies 
 
Clause applied to suspected enemy combatants held in U.S. custody by military officials. Boumediene v. 
Bush, 553 U.S. 723, 745–46 (2008). 
139  It is true that, due to a series of judicial decisions, there are often exceptions and other hurdles that make a 
remedy unavailable. However, the lack of a remedy is no excuse for failing to recognize the application of 
constitutional rights, particularly when dealing with judicially-created exceptions. The law evolves, and an 
exception recognized today may fade in the future. In that case, having access to the right would be vitally 
important, even if there is no current practical difference. 
140  See cases cited, infra, notes 152-159. 
141  Although there are not many criminal trials conducted under the auspices of United States sovereign power 
that take place outside of the territory of the United States, the United States Court for Berlin held that 
foreign nationals, tried in Berlin for violations of U.S. law, were entitled to constitutional rights including 
the right to a trial by jury. See U.S. v. Tiede, 86 F.R.D. 227 (D. Berlin 1979). This finding was made in spite 
of the fact that Tiede was tried in 1979 and the Federal Republic of Germany assumed full sovereign control 
of its territory on May 5, 1955. Id. at 232. 
142  On the contrary, where foreign corporations are concerned, the Court has consistently extended the 
protections of the Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process Clause. See generally Daimler, AG v. Bauman, 134 
S. Ct. 746 (2014); J. McIntyre Mach. Ltd. v. Nicastro, 564 U.S. 873 (2011); Goodyear Dunlop Tires 
Operations v. Brown, 564 U.S. 915 (2011); Asahi Metal Indus. Co. v. Superior Ct., 480 U.S. 102 (1987); 
Helicopteros Nacionales de Columbia v. Hall, 466 U.S. 408 (1984); Ins. Corp. of Ireland v. Compagnie Des 
Bauxites de Guinee, 456 U.S. 694 (1982); Perkins v. Benguet Consol. Mining Co., 342 U.S. 437 (1952). 
143  Verdugo-Urquidez, 494 U.S. at 278 (Kennedy, J., concurring). 
144  See generally McDonald v. Chicago, 560 U.S. 742 (2010) (right to bear arms); Benton v. Maryland, 395 U.S. 
784 (1969) (double jeopardy); Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145 (1968) (trial by impartial jury); Robinson v. 
California, 370 U.S. 660 (1962) (protection from cruel and unusual punishment); Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 
643 (1961) (unreasonable search and seizure); Everson v. Bd. of Educ., 330 U.S. 1 (1947) (incorporating 
Establishment Clause); Near v. Minnesota, 283 U.S. 697 (1931) (freedom of the press). These cases are 
merely a representative sample. See also Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319 (1937) for the test to determine 
which rights are so fundamental as to require incorporation. 
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them to the states.145 The Court has long held that the two Due Process Clauses are 
to be read to have the same content; if the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth 
Amendment contains these rights, then the Due Process Clause of the Fifth 
Amendment must contain them also.146 
The Court has repeatedly said that the Due Process Clause should be read 
expansively, and “conveys neither formal nor fixed nor narrow requirements. It is 
the compendious expression for all those rights which the courts must enforce 
because they are basic to our free society.”147 Tellingly, the Court used this language 
when deciding that the Fourth Amendment applied against the states. In Wolf v. 
Colorado, the Supreme Court held that the protections of the Fourth Amendment 
were “basic to a free society.”148 Justice Jackson famously described uncontrolled 
search and seizure as “one of the first and most effective weapons in the arsenal of 
every arbitrary government.”149 A majority of the Court adopted this view in 
Almeida-Sanchez v. United States, when it held that even an illegal alien within the 
United States could claim the protections of the Fourth Amendment.150 It makes 
perfect sense to extend the Fourth Amendment, recognized as fundamental to the 
concept of ordered liberty, to any against whom the United States wishes to extend 
its criminal process. 
Regardless of whether the Court extended the right under the Fourth or Fifth 
Amendment, it would be left with an important question: what would such 
application look like? Justice Kennedy identified three pragmatic problems with 
applying the warrant requirement overseas: (1) the lack of a magistrate authorized 
to issue such a warrant, (2) the differing conceptions of privacy in foreign countries, 
and (3) the need to cooperate with foreign officials.151 Congress could fix the first 
concern, though it has failed to take any action to do so. If the Court were to adopt a 
view of the Fourth Amendment as traveling with federal agents, the second concern 
would not be implicated; privacy conceptions of foreign countries would not 
matter—the appropriate question would be whether the search complied with U.S. 
conceptions of privacy. While the need to cooperate with foreign officials can of 
course be important, such international cooperation cannot overrule the 
 
145  See Wolf v. Colorado, 338 U.S. 25 (1949) (noting that guarantees of the Bill of Rights are applied to the 
states via the Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process Clause). 
146  See generally Heiner v. Donnan, 285 U.S. 312, 326 (1932) (holding that restraint imposed upon legislation 
by the Due Process Clauses of the Fourteenth and Fifth Amendments is the same); Twining v. New Jersey, 
211 U.S. 78, 100, 101 (1908) (holding that because the two amendments use identical words, they should be 
interpreted identically); Hibben v. Smith, 191 U.S. 310, 325 (1903) (“The Fourteenth Amendment, it has 
been held, legitimately operates to extend to the citizens and residents of the states the same protection 
against arbitrary state legislation affecting life, liberty, and property as is offered by the Fifth Amendment 
against similar legislation by Congress . . . .”). 
147  Wolf v. Colorado, 338 U.S. at 27. 
148  Id. 
149  Brinegar v. United States, 338 U.S. 160, 180 (1949) (Jackson, J., dissenting). 
150  Almeida-Sanchez v. United States, 413 U.S. 266, 274–75 (1973). 
151  Verdugo-Urquidez, 494 U.S. at 278 (Kennedy, J., concurring). Neither the Verdugo-Urquidez majority, nor 
Justice Kennedy, addressed how to apply the Warrant Clause to extraterritorial searches involving aliens 
with substantial connections. 
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requirements of the Constitution.152 Furthermore, if the United States deems such 
cooperation to be vital, it may still engage in such cooperation—it just may not rely 
on the fruits of an illegal search in a U.S. prosecution. 
While one might expect Congress to swiftly create a magistrate authorized to 
issue foreign warrants if the Court were to vigorously enforce such a requirement 
on extraterritorial searches, such an extreme step is unnecessary. In addition to 
requiring a warrant, the Fourth Amendment also contains the reasonableness 
requirement, which has played an ever-larger role in recent jurisprudence.153 Both 
Justice Stevens and Justice Blackmun supported this approach in their respective 
Verdugo-Urquidez opinions.154 Assessing reasonableness is a familiar judicial 
function. The question becomes when to apply the reasonableness requirement. 
Even with my proposed test there can be a question of whether U.S. agents were the 
ones conducting the search, particularly in a situation like Verdugo-Urquidez, 
where they work closely with local authorities. Thankfully, lower courts already 
have vast experience in this area. 
A host of lower court cases have addressed the proper scope of Fourth 
Amendment protections in relation to searches of U.S. citizens conducted abroad—
particularly the use in U.S. courts of evidence obtained during such searches.155 The 
most common methodological tool used by these courts is the joint venture test.156 
This test determines whether agents of the United States had “sufficient 
participation” in the search to justify applying the exclusionary rule.157 If U.S. 
 
152  See Medellin v. Texas, 552 U.S. 491 (2008). There, the Court held that the president could not prevent 
Texas from carrying out the execution of a Mexican national who had been denied his rights under Article 
36 of the Vienna Convention on Consular relations, even in the face of a ruling from the International Court 
of Justice that the United States was required to comply. The Court held that since the Vienna Convention 
was not self-executing, only Congress could require enforcement, a decision that caused international 
friction. 
153  See Ohio v. Robinette, 519 U.S. 33, 39 (1996) (“We have long held that the ‘touchstone of the Fourth 
Amendment is reasonableness.’” (quoting Florida v. Jimeno, 500 U.S. 248, 250 (1991)); Riley v. California, 
134 S. Ct. 2473 (2014) (“As the text makes clear, ‘the ultimate touchstone of the Fourth Amendment is 
“reasonableness.”’” (quoting Brigham City v. Stuart, 547 U.S. 398, 403 (2006)). 
154  Both Justices believed the appropriate question was whether the search was reasonable. Justice Stevens 
believed it was, and Justice Blackmun would have remanded the case to the lower courts to examine the 
question in the first instance. Compare Verdugo-Urquidez, 494 U.S. at 279 (Stevens, J., concurring), with 
id. at 297–98 (Blackmun, J., concurring). 
155  See generally United States v. Stokes, 726 F.3d 880, 886 (7th Cir. 2013) (foreign search conducted jointly by 
U.S. and foreign agents); In re Terrorist Bombings of U.S. Embassies in E. Afr. (Fourth Amendment 
Challenges), 552 F.3d 157, 160 (2d Cir. 2008) (foreign search conducted by U.S. agents); United States v. 
Maturo, 982 F.2d 57, 59 (2d Cir. 1992) (foreign search conducted by foreign agents); United States v. 
Peterson, 812 F.2d 486, 489 (9th Cir. 1987) (foreign search conducted jointly by U.S. and foreign agents); 
United States v. Demanett, 629 F.2d 862, 865 (3d Cir. 1980) (foreign search conducted by U.S. agents); 
United States v. Rose, 570 F.2d 1358, 1360 (9th Cir. 1978) (foreign search conducted by foreign agents); 
United States v. Morrow, 537 F.2d 120, 130 (5th Cir. 1976) (same); Brulay v. United States, 383 F.2d 345, 
347–48 (9th Cir. 1967) (foreign search conducted by foreign agents); United States v. Grisby, 335 F.2d 652, 
653–54 (4th Cir. 1964) (foreign search conducted by U.S. agents). For an examination of two different 
searches by different sets of agents and their effects on the Fourth Amendment analysis, see United States 
v. Barona, 56 F.3d 1087, 1089–90 (9th Cir. 1995). 
156  E.g., United States v. Peterson, 812 F.2d 486, 490 (9th Cir. 1987). 
157  Id. 
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agents did not substantially participate, then exclusion of seized evidence is not 
warranted because exclusion has no deterrent effect on foreign law enforcement.158 
This joint venture test has been used both before Verdugo-Urquidez159 and after.160 
My approach does not suggest the wholesale adoption of the joint venture test 
since I believe part of the test is flawed. As conceptualized, the test holds that if the 
U.S. agents did substantially participate in the search, the court will examine the 
law of the foreign country to determine if the search was reasonable.161 Under my 
conception, this is an inappropriate inquiry. The proper basis for determining 
reasonability is U.S. law. Thus, an examination of foreign law is unnecessary when 
U.S. agents are conducting the search or are substantially involved. As noted above, 
applying the exclusionary rule to searches conducted entirely by foreign entities 
does not serve any deterrent effect. Thus, if, for example, the British government 
conducted a search of a British citizen, found evidence of a violation of U.S. law, and 
turned that evidence over to U.S. federal agents for prosecution, the Fourth 
Amendment is not implicated. One could imagine that this might lead to the 
outsourcing of searches of foreign lawbreakers to foreign governments. However, 
two considerations mitigate against this concern. 
First, under the joint venture test as currently practiced, U.S. courts only 
care about compliance with foreign law if U.S. agents are substantially involved in 
the search. This has not led to outsourcing U.S. criminal investigations of U.S. 
citizens abroad. Second, in addition to the joint venture test, courts have also 
recognized exceptions for foreign searches which “shock the [judicial] conscience” 
regardless of who has carried them out.162 Thus, even in cases where countries have 
much lower standards for searches than the United States, if the behavior of foreign 
agents is egregious, U.S. courts will recognize them as antithetical to the very idea 
of due process. The “shocks the conscience” test thus serves as a judicial backstop 
against the most outrageous actions by foreign governments. 
Overall, there is much to recommend the modified joint venture test. It 
provides a clear framework for when the Fourth Amendment would apply: if the 
search is conducted by foreign agents on their own initiative, or with little U.S. 
 
158  Very few of the cases involved such a fact pattern. See, e.g., United States v. Baboolol, No. 05-CR-215, 2006 
WL 1674480, at *2–3 (E.D. Wis. June 16, 2006) (challenging search of Canadian citizen’s Canadian 
residence by Canadian police). 
159  See, e.g., United States v. Morrow, 537 F.2d 120, 140 (5th Cir. 1976) (citing Stonehill v. United States, 405 
F.2d 738, 743 (9th Cir. 1968)). 
160  See United States v. Stokes, 726 F.3d 880, 890–91 (7th Cir. 2013) (citing United States v. Barona, 56 F.3d 
1087, 1091 (9th Cir. 1994)); United States v. Barona, 56 F.3d 1087 (9th Cir. 1994). But cf. United States v. 
Vilar, No. S305CR621KMK, 2007 WL 1075041, *54 & n.34 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 4, 2007) (noting that the Second 
Circuit had not adopted the joint venture doctrine, but finding applicability of the Fourth Amendment when 
cooperation with foreign law enforcement “is designed to evade constitutional requirements applicable to 
American officials”). 
161  Peterson, 812 F.2d at 490. 
162  See, e.g., United States v. Rose, 570 F.2d 1358, 1362 (9th Cir. 1978) (alternation in original) (citing Birdsell 
v. United States, 346 F.2d 775, 782 n.10 (5th Cir. 1965).). Unlike a Fourth Amendment violation, which the 
Court held occurs at the time of the search, the “shocks the conscience” test is an exercise of the Fifth 
Amendment’s Due Process Clause and a violation occurs at trial. Koff, supra note 9, at 443 n.20. 
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involvement, the Fourth Amendment does not apply.163 Regardless of the reach of 
the Fourth Amendment, it certainly does not bind non-U.S. agents. Numerous 
courts have pointed out that the exclusionary rule has no deterrent effect on such 
agents. If the search is a true joint venture between the United States and foreign 
agents or if U.S. agents conduct searches on their own in foreign countries, then the 
Fourth Amendment does apply.164 
The modified joint venture test does not implicate the three practical 
concerns identified by Justice Kennedy, if properly applied. First, there is no need 
for a magistrate to issue an ex ante ruling on reasonableness. Aliens may raise 
challenges to searches conducted, in whole or in part, by U.S. agents in motions in 
limine seeking to exclude illegally seized evidence. Second, cooperation with foreign 
officials is assumed under the joint venture test. As for the concern about differing 
conceptions of privacy, the modified joint venture test proposed in this Article looks 
to U.S. conceptions of privacy when U.S. agents are involved. Even in a case where 
the foreign agents act alone and the defendant argues their conduct “shocks the 
conscience,” courts would not be called upon to delve into foreign law because the 
“shocks the conscience” test is based on U.S. standards.165 
This only leaves the question of searches conducted on the high seas. These 
types of searches are typically conducted solely by U.S. agents under statutes such 
as the Maritime Drug Law Enforcement Act.166 In this circumstance, U.S. 
magistrates are well acquainted with making determinations of reasonableness in 
the absence of a warrant. They should ask whether the U.S. agents had probable 
cause to conduct the search and seizure. Far from being unusual, this sort of post 
hoc review of probable cause on the high seas continues a tradition that has been in 
place since the Founding.167 The modified joint venture test is actually more useful 
here because there is no local law to apply on the high seas. 
The test proposed in this Article would have numerous advantages over the 
substantial connections test. First, it is logically consistent and supported by the 
text and structure of the Constitution, recognizing that the Fourth Amendment is a 
check on government power to safeguard pre-existing rights held by all people. 
Second, it provides guidance to the lower courts that the substantial connections 
 
163  Lower courts have vast experience applying the joint venture test. Koff, supra note 9, at 442 n.19. This 
experience has only grown since 1994. 
164  There may be cases where the deterrent effect of the exclusionary rule plays no part, such as when the 
government wants the information for intelligence purposes rather than criminal justice. In those cases, 
aliens are in no worse shape than their American counterparts subjected to such searches. Absent 
congressional action to allow a damages remedy, even U.S. citizens are unlikely to win a Bivens action 
against federal agents. 
165  To be sure, a court could look to see if the search by foreign agents complies with foreign law as a measure 
of whether their behavior “shocks the conscience.” Courts routinely look to foreign law in deciding whether 
foreign searches of U.S. citizens are reasonable. See supra note 155. Additionally, courts routinely apply 
foreign law in other contexts, such as contracts. There is no reason why discerning foreign search and 
seizure law should be any more difficult, especially when courts make clear that it is up to the parties to 
provide evidence of the substance of foreign law. 
166  Maritime Drug Law Enforcement Act, 46 U.S.C. §§ 70501–70508 (2018). 
167  See Little v. Barreme, 6 U.S. 170, 177–178 (1804); Talbot v. Seeman, 5 U.S. 1, 31–32 (1801). 
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test severely lacks. Rather than trying to determine if an alien has enough ties to 
qualify for the protections of the Fourth Amendment, it provides a bright line rule 
that when U.S. agents conduct a search, the Fourth Amendment travels with them, 
regardless of where the search occurs. While there may be some disputes at the 
boundaries of sufficient participation, long experience in the lower courts shows 
that this is a much more manageable standard, which has not led to wildly differing 
interpretations.168 Finally, the baseline rule that the Constitution travels with U.S. 
agents can be expanded to the interpretation of other amendments without doing 
damage to the text of those amendments.169 Thus, the proposed rule solves the 
problems caused by the substantial connections test without imposing undue costs 
on the federal judiciary. 
The Verdugo-Urquidez majority identified two practical concerns with 
extending the Warrant Clause of the Fourth Amendment outside the United States: 
1) the rule adopted by the court of appeals would apply to both law enforcement and 
other foreign policy operations abroad which might result in searches or seizures, 
and 2) the majority feared the specter of subjecting U.S. agents to Bivens liability 
for their actions abroad.170 Subsequent developments have undercut these concerns. 
Regarding the application of the Fourth Amendment to military actions, 
there are three responses. First, the Court has long recognized exceptions to the 
Fourth Amendment, particularly where the foreign affairs powers of the United 
States are concerned. As one example, the Court has long recognized the special 
needs doctrine which provides an exception to the Fourth Amendment where law 
enforcement is not the primary purpose.171 Thus, even if the Court adopted a rule 
that the Fourth Amendment applied everywhere, recognized exceptions to the 
Warrant Clause would travel with it. 
Second, courts have applied the Fourth Amendment’s reasonableness 
requirement to military searches without ill effect.172 This argument is also 
undercut by the U.S. military’s own regulations. As Justice Brennan pointed out in 
 
168  Furthermore, in those cases where the courts determine that aliens have substantial connections, they 
would still be required to conduct the joint venture test for searches conducted abroad since such aliens 
have rights. My proposed test would merely eliminate the first stage of the inquiry. 
169  My intention is merely to address the specific question asked by Verdugo-Urquidez. However, I recognize 
that lower courts have vastly expanded the reach of the substantial connections test, so any proposed 
replacement must be at least as capable of application to other provisions while doing substantially less 
damage to them. 
170  United States v. Verdugo-Urquidez, 494 U.S. 259, 273–74 (1990). 
171  See New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325, 351 (1985) (Blackmun, J., concurring); United States v. Kincade, 
379 F.3d 813, 823–24 (9th Cir. 2004) (collecting cases). For a history of the special needs doctrine and its 
application to foreign affairs and national security, see Sarah Fowler, Note, Circumventing the Constitution 
for National Security: An Analysis of the Evolution of the Foreign Intelligence Exception to the Fourth 
Amendment’s Warrant Requirement, 4 U. MIAMI NAT’L SECURITY & ARMED CONFLICT L. REV. 207, 215–16 
(2014). This exception applies when complying with the warrant requirement would be impractical. 
172  See Best v. United States, 184 F.2d 131, 138–39 (1st Cir. 1950). Best, a U.S. citizen, broadcast Nazi 
propaganda during the war. After the war ended, he was arrested by Occupation Forces and his Vienna 
apartment was searched. The First Circuit assumed the Fourth Amendment applied and conducted a 
reasonableness inquiry, determining that it in the circumstances of the search—occurring in an occupied 
country under military government, deemed necessary by military commanders—the search was not 
unreasonable. 
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his dissent, Department of the Army regulations in place at the time of Verdugo-
Urquidez required that the Army seek a judicial warrant from a U.S. court 
whenever the Army sought “to intercept the wire or oral communications of a 
person not subject to the Uniform Code of Military Justice outside of the US and its 
territories.”173 Thus, even the military, about which the majority was concerned, did 
not object to the warrant requirement on some of its activities. 
Finally, the Court could create a new exception to the Fourth Amendment for 
military activities specifically. The Court was concerned about the breadth of the 
lower court’s rule, but it acted as if it were faced with the Hobson’s choice of 
applying the Fourth Amendment to all actions outside the United States or to none 
of them. In fact, the Court regularly recognizes exceptions to the Fourth 
Amendment, largely based on practicality, which it could narrow solely to the 
military context. 
The second concern identified by the Court—subjecting U.S. agents abroad to 
Bivens liability—has been overtaken by subsequent legal developments. In the 
quarter century since Verdugo-Urquidez was decided, the Court has all but 
abandoned Bivens as a viable option outside of the very specific contexts in which a 
remedy has previously been recognized.174 Courts have consistently rejected the 
application of Bivens remedies to any actions taking place outside the U.S., finding 
“special factors counseling hesitation.”175 While the Court acknowledged that such 
special factors might exist, it was concerned about the “case-by-case adjudications 
concerning the availability of such an action.”176 However, the consistent rejection of 
new Bivens remedies has proven this concern is nothing more than a paper tiger. 
Therefore, the Court’s practical concerns with extending the Fourth Amendment to 
aliens have been alleviated.177 
CONCLUSION 
Nearly thirty years ago, the Court addressed the extraterritorial application 
of the Fourth Amendment for the first—and so far, last—time. There were 
numerous problems with the majority’s holding, which have only been borne out 
over the last three decades. With an increased interest in the rights of aliens coming 
before the lower courts, the time has come to rethink the rationale of the decision. 
The current rationale provides little guidance to lower courts and has been 
applied to areas of law where it is wholly inappropriate. For those reasons, it is time 
 
173  Verdugo-Urquidez, 494 U.S. at 296 n.14 (Brennan, J., dissenting). 
174  See Ziglar v. Abbasi, 137 S. Ct. 1843, 1869 (2017) (denying Bivens remedy to aliens held in U.S. prison after 
September 11 attacks); Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 675 (2009) (“Because implied causes of action are 
disfavored, the Court has been reluctant to extend Bivens liability ‘to any new context or new category of 
defendants.’” (quoting Corr. Servs. Corp. v. Malesko, 534 U.S. 61, 68 (2001))). 
175  See Meshal v. Higgenbotham, 804 F.3d 417, 425–26 (D.C. Cir. 2015); Vance v. Rumsfeld, 701 F.3d 193, 199 
(7th Cir. 2012). 
176  Verdugo-Urquidez, 494 U.S. at 274. 
177  It is also unclear why the Court was concerned with such liability arising toward aliens with no ties to the 
United States when an alien with substantial ties would have a viable Bivens claim. The Court fails to 
explain why the existence of ties would alleviate its concerns. 
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to replace it with a rationale that makes sense. The proper way to conceptualize the 
extraterritorial Fourth Amendment is to rely on a method courts have been using 
for over fifty years: the modified joint venture test. Searches conducted wholly by 
foreign law enforcement would not be covered by the Fourth Amendment; those 
conducted with substantial involvement of U.S. law enforcement would be subject to 
review under the Fourth Amendment’s command of reasonableness. The 
conceptions of reasonableness are defined by the U.S. Constitution, which travels 
with U.S. agents wherever and against whomever they may act. These principles 
are familiar to courts, have a long pedigree in judicial precedent, and appropriately 
balance the interests of law enforcement and the rights of individuals, while also 
taking into account the practical problems with demanding extraterritorial 
warrants. If the Court were to adopt this reasoning, it would go a long way to 
cleaning up this area of law. 
 
